This paper studies imperfect price competition between two intermediaries in an electronic business-to-business matching market with indirect network externalities. The intermediaries have non-identical ownership structures: an independent incumbent competes with a challenging buy-side consortium in attracting buyers and sellers. When firms can register with at most one intermediary, the incumbent is able to deter entry if the number of firms taking ownership in the consortium is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the consortium can enter and monopolize the market.
After the slow-down of the initial hype associated with commercial internet activities between companies and consumers (business-to-consumer or B2C electronic commerce), in recent years the focus of electronic commerce tended towards electronic transactions and relationships between companies (business-to-business or B2B e-commerce) which have consequently attracted considerable interest and investment capital. The transaction volume as well as the growth potential is indeed much higher in B2B than in B2C e-commerce. E.g. in 2000 the Gartner Group estimated the worldwide B2B transaction volume to increase from $145 billion in 1999 to over $7 trillion in 2004. Around 37% of this total volume will be done via B2B marketplaces acting as intermediaries in two-sided buyer-seller markets.
However, despite this promising overall outlook of B2B e-commerce, especially the future of independent marketplaces is highly questionable. Over 400 B2B marketplaces that were predicted a glorious future some years ago had shut down by 2001 and only about 100 B2B marketplaces handled any genuine transactions in the same year. 1 Mainly independent third-party marketplaces have begun consolidating by shutting down or merging. Besides internal problems, as e.g. lack of liquidity, one of the main reasons for this decline lies in the increasing direct competition from upcoming collaborative (or biased) B2B marketplaces, which are jointly provided by industry competitors. 2 A well-known example is Covisint which is a joint buy-side platform of the automotive manufacturers DaimlerChrysler, Ford, General Motors, Renault-Nissan and PSA Peugeot Citroen. In fact, such consortia-led marketplaces dispose of a competitive advantage in the positioning to generate transactions since companies share the ownership while also being active participants in the market. Contrarily, the owners of third-party marketplaces are no trading partners. This makes it comparatively harder to attain a critical mass of participants which in turn is crucial for an intermediary's prospects of success because of network effects, which are typical for such two-sided buyer-seller markets. This paper contributes a theoretical framework for analysis of the ongoing process of de-intermediation and re-intermediation in the B2B landscape, reflecting the consolidated elimination of initially prevalent third-party intermediaries, together with market entry of collaborative intermediaries. We account for the fact that a crucial feature for a marketplace's prospects of success is its ownership structure. This happens by studying the impact on market structures and participation incentives of buying and selling firms when B2B marketplaces with non-identical ownership structures engage in price competition in a bilateral matching market. I.e. we consider a collaborative buy-side B2B marketplace, meaning that some buy-side firms form a coalition to build up their own marketplace, 3 as challenging competitor to an incumbent neutral intermediary in terms of attracting participants from each market side.
In particular, we show that even if an incumbent third party owned B2B marketplace has a reputation advantage, a challenging collaborative entrant is able to catch (at least) some market share. When intermediaries compete in access fees and registration is exclusively possible with only one marketplace, the entrant is able to overcome its reputation disadvantage while monopolizing the market, whenever the number of firms that provide the collaborative B2B marketplace is sufficiently large. In other words, in such a case there is no entry deterring pricing strategy that enables the incumbent to stay in the market making (weakly) positive profits. When the B2B marketplaces are able to observe the occurrence of trade between two matched partners, they can apply transaction taxes as an additional pricing instrument. In such a situation the consortium can always enter the market. Furthermore, when agents can multi-home, i.e. they simultaneously register with both marketplaces, there also exists no pricing strategy that enables the independent incumbent to deter entry. However, in such a scenario both marketplaces remain in the market and sellers multi-home whereas buyers are segmented among both intermediaries.
These results are driven by indirect network effects. A buyer's value of participation in a B2B marketplace increases with the number of participating sellers and vice versa. Each participant is not only a consumer but also an input for an intermediary.
Therefore an intermediary has to attract a large number of participants from one market side, say buyers, to ensure participation from agents on the other market side, while buyers are only willing to participate if they expect many sellers to register with the same intermediary. 4 Due to this particular market characteristic, intermediaries apply pricing strategies that subsidize participants from one market side and recover this loss on the other market side. In this regard, there is a crucial difference between an independent B2B marketplace and the collaborative buy-side B2B marketplace: besides providing intermediation services the latter already comprises some firms that participate in the matching process in terms of those buyers taking ownership in the joined marketplace. Hence, attracting sellers becomes easier for the collaborative marketplace because it can offer an additional input at the time of entrance.
Related literature:
Excellent overviews on descriptive categorizations of B2B markets and on the impact of the usage of B2B markets on transaction costs provide Lucking-Reiley and Spulber concentrate on a neutral B2B intermediary's pricing decisions in the presence of network effects. In contrast to our approach they do not model competition between B2B marketplaces, also bilateral matching is omitted in their model.
Matching in intermediated markets is a widely studied field in the literature. E.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) examine a bilateral bargaining model under complete information to show that middlemen may exist to reduce search costs in a market with intermediation based on a time-consuming, stochastic matching-process. When buyers have diverse levels of willingness to pay, and suppliers differ with respect to their opportunity costs, intermediaries can eliminate the uncertainty arising from random matches in a decentralized fashion by posting bid and ask prices. Hence, they provide an advantage over a decentralized matching market (see Spulber, 1996b) . Spulber (1996a) presents a model with several competing intermediaries, which act as price-setters.
Gehrig (1993) deals with intermediation in search markets. In his model heterogenous buyers and sellers choose between direct trade on a search market and intermediated trade where a monopoly intermediary posts bid and ask prices.
Most related to this paper are the models by Jullien (2001, 2003) who analyze competition between two ex ante symmetric third-party intermediaries in a bilateral electronic matching market. Their main finding is that there always exist pricing strategies so that an incumbent intermediary can prevent entry of a competitor if buyers and sellers have so-called "bad expectations" against the potential entrant, i.e. they register with the incumbent, whenever it is not a dominated strategy. They claim that such a reputation advantage creates a powerful barrier to entry. We show that their findings do not generally apply when competing B2B marketplaces have non-identical ownership structures. Moreover, our results go into the opposite direction since in our model the challenging collaborative entrant is able to exert a competitive advantage despite bad expectations against it.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the assumptions of the model are introduced in section 2. In section 3 we analyze intermediaries competing in access fees.
In section 4 we introduce transaction taxes as an additional pricing instrument. Section 5 deals with competition when intermediation services are non-exclusive. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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The framework we use is a simplified version of the models by Caillaud Note that the registration fee p k j can be negative, which would represent a certain type of subsidizing joining agents. 6 On the other hand, we restrict the analysis to values t k with 1 ≥ t k ≥ 0 because negative transaction fees would result in arbitrary pairs of agents pretending to match simply to collect the fee. 7 5 This assumption guarantees that no market side has an extremely dominant position in the bargaining process. 6 Since we normalized the intermediaries' cost to zero, a negative registration fee might be interpreted as a price below marginal cost. In case that this is a large effect, the price can indeed be negative. This can be interpreted as the agent receiving free access to the marketplace and getting additional services as e.g. installing customer data in the database. 7 See Caillaud and Jullien (2001).
Marketplaces competing in access fees
The basic model is of competition in access fees, when intermediation services are exclusive, i.e. agents can only register with one marketplace I or E, but not with both.
This may be because the data to build a firm specific profile in a data base are considered proprietary. Or, an intermediary might establish exclusivity to impose a certain guarantee for its efforts in processing the users' demands ending up with a transaction.
Intermediaries compete in access fees corresponding to a one-time joining fee which is indeed considered to be the most applied pricing scheme on B2B marketplaces.
The game structure is as follows: first, the incumbent I chooses its access prices
which are supposed to be fixed afterwards. Second, E enters the market by setting its best response prices
is then characterized by the allocation of agents n k i (P I , P E ) i,k , which is the result of a rational expectation market decision process by j-users, given any P I , P E and
An equilibrium comprises pricing strategies and a system of market allocations for each possible price system, such that prices are a Nash equilibrium in the reduced-form pricing game induced by the system of market allocations.
Suppose that users of both populations hold favorable beliefs for intermediary I so that j-users think that n I i = 1 whenever it is not irrational for i-users to do so (whenever it is not a dominated strategy for i-users to register with I). This can be interpreted as a certain reputation advantage of the incumbent. Now we consider that some share n EO b ∈ (0, 1] of buy-side firms intends to build up an own collaborative B2B
marketplace E for intermediation services, 8 competing with I. This is only profitable if the expected utility from the joint provision of E, which is supposed to be in equal shares, is higher for all firms n EO b than remaining at I, yielding:
8 Note that we consider n
EO b
to be exogenous since we are interested in the prospect of success of such a consortium given the number of participating providers.
The left hand side is the expected total profit of the collaborative B2B marketplace, 9 which is decomposed into the expected benefits from trade by ownership taking firms n EO b n E s u b as well as expected payments n E i p E i from participating sellers and buyers, respectively. The right hand side of (1) register with E but do not participate in its ownership. Hence, the total number of
then sellers cannot rationally believe that n I b = 1. They hold (rational) beliefs that n E b > 0 and consider registering to E by comparing the expected utility at E with the utility when staying at I and 0 when not registering with any intermediary. Hence, intermediary E must charge prices so that
in order to convince sellers to register with E. The left hand side is a sellers expected utility from registration with the new marketplace E, the right hand side shows the utility when staying at intermediary I. Now, provided E adopts a pricing strategy so that (2) holds, it is a dominant strategy for sellers to register with E and the remaining buyers at I, namely n I b , cannot rationally believe that n I s = 1. They hold (rational) beliefs that n E s = 1 and must then consider registering with E as well by comparing
with −p I b and 0 (if they do not register at all). So, with beliefs favorable to I, maximal profits for intermediary E are given by
with meaning 'slightly bigger than'. Hence, for P I = (p I s , p I b ) to be supported as a dominant firm equilibrium, it must necessarily hold that those n EO b buyers cannot profitably leave I and build up their own marketplace E, so that it follows from (3) together with (1) that Proof. The proof is relegated to the appendix.
This result is driven by indirect network effects. The higher the number n EO b of potential buy-side firms taking ownership in E, the higher is the incentive for firms on the other market side (sellers) to switch to E. In the presence of bad-expectations against E, the entrant would have to apply a so-called "divide-and-conquer" strategy 10 to get a positive market share. That means, E would have to "bribe" sellers (divide) while recovering this loss on the other market side (conquer). Contrarily to benchmark case of Caillaud and Jullien (2001) , where a challenging independent intermediary has to subsidize one market side through negative access prices, in our framework the collaborative marketplace E has an additional tool for attracting sellers since besides the mere provision of a matching platform, the collaborative B2B marketplace already offers a certain amount n EO b of buy-side matching partners. This constitutes an additional input for subscribing sellers who can expect to profit from participation in E in two ways:
first, their expected probability of trade and second a potentially negative registration fee (bribe). Accordingly, the higher the share n EO b of providing firms at E, the higher is a participating seller's expected matching probability and the lower is the bribe which is necessary to convince a seller to switch to E.
10 See e.g. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) . positive profits implying prices as specified above.
Proposition 2 I can only sustain dominant firm equilibria if n
EO b ≤ 1 2 . In case that n EO b ∈ [0, u b −u s u b −2us ]
this happens by subsidizing buyers with prices
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
In order to deter E's entrance, I has to create a strong bound to (at least) one market side through the application of negative access fees. This creates an incentive for agents on the subsidized market side to stay with I and attracts agents from the other market side through the associated network effect. Note, that terms of having already some buy-side firms at E is outbalanced by the buy-subsidy at I so that building up an own marketplace E cannot be profitable. On the other hand, at E, sellers' incentive from having already some potential matching partners at E cannot compensate for the subsidy which sellers would forgo when leaving I.
Competition with access fees and transaction taxes
Let us extent the analysis by introducing transaction fees t k as a further pricing instrument. It is assumed that intermediaries can observe and verify whether trade take place but not the exact transaction price, so that the transaction fee depends on the occurrence of trade only. Such a fee is supposed to be paid by agents ex post after a transaction between two matched partners takes place. Hence, the net surplus to be shared among matched partners is (1 − t k ) ≥ 0. We impose transaction fees to be (weakly) positive, so that 1 ≥ t k ≥ 0, because negative transaction fees would result in arbitrary pairs of agents pretending to match simply to collect the fee. 14 Indeed, the application of transaction dependent fees is widespread among B2B
13 In this case,
< 0, so that the critical value would no lie between = and 0.5 in figure 1. 14 We refer the reader to Caillaud and Jullien (2003) who provide a detailed justification for focusing only on the total transaction fee instead of differentiated fees for buyers and sellers, respectively. marketplaces especially when the fulfillment of transactions is observable. Jullien (2001, 2003) find that in such a set-up the incumbent intermediary is able to sustain dominant firm equilibria implying zero profits. We show, that this findings do not hold in case of competing intermediaries with different ownership structures.
Again, we look at E's best response to the prices p I i , t I set by I, when beliefs favor the incumbent. E's entrance will only be profitable if the expected utility from the collaborative B2B marketplace is higher for each firm n EO b than remaining at I,
As in (1), the left hand side shows the maximum profit the collaborative B2B marketplace could make. This profit is decomposed into n EO b n E s u b as expected benefits from trade by ownership taking firms as well as expected payments n E s (p E s + n E b u s t E ) and at I. 15 To attract sellers, E would have to apply a pricing strategy such that there is an incentive for sellers to leave I. Note that (given that (5) holds) there is already a positive share n EO b of buyers at E so that joining sellers can expect a positive matching probability. Therefore, E has a second incentive to offer sellers apart from paying access bonuses. Sellers join E, if the associated benefit is higher than staying at I, given that n EO b buyers left I to build their own marketplace E. This yields
The left hand side is a seller's benefit from switching to E, while the right hand side is the maximum of the corresponding benefit from staying with I, and 0 as expected utility from not registering with any intermediary, respectively. If (6) holds, it is a dominant strategy for all sellers to switch to E so that non-ownership taking buyers have to believe that n E s = 1. Those buyers then have to compare u b (1 − t E ) − p E b as 15 
It is implied that ownership taking buyers do not incur any transaction nor registration fees, that is p EO b
= t EO = 0, due to the same argumentation as in the scenario with competition in access fees.
expected utility from also registering with E, with −p I b as expected utility from staying with I, and 0 as utility when not registering with any intermediary. Hence, those buyers will decide to register with E provided
E's maximal potential profits then read as:
Note, that the achievement of the highest possible profit for E always implies for E to set the maximum transaction fee t E = 1, which can be applied without jeopardizing the sellers' possible shift from I to E. Hence, (8) can be simplified, yielding
A dominant firm structure where I can successfully deter entrance of the challenging consortium requires a pricing strategy so that E's maximal potential profits are less than 
Proof. See the appendix. 16 Since in such a framework there exist multiple equilibria we are particularly interested in the maximum profits the entrant could make given that the incumbent wants to minimize the entrants profits.
Again, this result is due to the feature that besides providing intermediation services, the owners of the collaborative consortium also participate in matching process.
Compared to the benchmark case of an independent challenging intermediary competing with an independent incumbent, 17 attracting agents from one market side, i.e. in our case conquering sellers, is easier for the consortium E since sellers expect a strictly positive matching probability. The possibility of applying transaction taxes as a second pricing instrument benefits the entrant. This is due to the following: given that beliefs favor I, so that agents register with I whenever it is not a dominant strategy to do so, both pricing instruments are perfect substitutes for I in terms of extracting profits from participants. For the potential entrant, charging a high transaction tax t E = 1 allows E to achieve an additional benefit since users pay this fee only by the share u i .
Therefore, a high transaction tax reduces E's cost of attracting sellers dramatically.
When transaction taxes can be applied, it is not possible for the incumbent to prevent that E attracts any trade because the share of profit needed to be forgone by I in order to protect a potential monopoly position is too big, so that I could not stay in the market at (weakly) positive profits.
Competition with non-exclusive intermediation services
Now we relax the assumption that registration is exclusively possible with only one intermediary. Firms might register with both B2B marketplaces simultaneously ("multihoming") in order to benefit from their different user bases so to increase their matching probability. The matching processes the two marketplaces perform are supposed to be independent. We explicitly exclude firms n EO b that take ownership in E from the possibility of also registering with I since this would hold obvious results: the benefit which firms n EO b initially obtain at I could be used to pay a (incrementally) small subsidy to firms at E, so that all other firms would subscribe with E as well. Therefore, with I, this result holds, which is in contrast to Caillaud and Jullien (2001) , where the incumbent can apply an entry deterring pricing scheme.
Proposition 4 In a scenario with multi-homing and competition in access fees, there
exists no entry deterring pricing strategy the incumbent could apply. In equilibrium both marketplaces are active and make positive profits π I = (1 − n EO b ) and π E n EO b .
Sellers multi-home, while non-ownership taking buyers register only with the incumbent

I. Equilibrium prices imply p
Proof. The overall profit of E is still as on the left hand side in (1). Sellers will now register with E, as long as the associated expected benefit is greater than zero,
The difference with the case of exclusivity is that here, agents do not necessarily have to leave I when registering at E. Hence, agents might register with E as "second-home".
Accordingly, sellers simultaneously stay with I, only if they expect (weakly) positive profits given the share (1 − n EO b ) of remaining buyers at I, so that
If (10) holds, the (1 − n EO b ) buy-side firms have to believe, that n E s = 1, so that they will register with E, provided that
Note that n I s can only take values ∈ {0, 1}: if n I s = 1, I's pricing strategy is such that all sellers stay at the same time with I, so that E tries to attract remaining buyers as a second source. Hence, the only chance for E to attract those buyers ( 
In a dominant firm equilibrium with I being the only active intermediary, it must hold that I makes (weakly) positive profits so that p I b + p I s ≥ 0. Since I can only stay in the market when agents from both market sides register, p I s has to meet condition (11) . This is obviously a contradiction to (13) and I's zero profit condition. Since E cannot profit from attracting non-ownership taking buyers, it is obvious that I stays in the market.
Equilibrium prices and profits then follow from the conditions above. Accordingly, in a scenario where multi-homing is possible and intermediaries compete in access fees, there is no entry deterring pricing strategy that enables I to remain the only active intermediary. with certainty since all sellers stay with I as well (given that I applies a pricing scheme such that (11) holds). Accordingly, those buyers taking ownership in E are the only buy-side users of their marketplace.
The paper at hand deals with the analysis of imperfect price competition between two intermediaries in an electronic B2B matching market. The essential contribution is the analysis of competing intermediaries that differ with respect to their ownership structure in terms of the impact on market structures and firms' participation incentives.
We consider a collaborative B2B marketplace which is owned by some firms from one market side competing with an independent "classic type" intermediary. This is to account for recent developments in B2B e-commerce, namely the formation of industry consortiums for establishing business-to-business electronic marketplaces together with the decline of independent B2B marketplaces. Many of the latter type were highly valued during the initial technology-stock race at the advent of B2B e-commerce some years ago, but recently they are often facing problems. One of the main reason for this development is due to the increasing direct competition from upcoming collaborative B2B marketplaces.
A key aspect of such intermediated markets is the "chicken & egg" nature, meaning that buyers (sellers) are interested in registering with a B2B marketplace only if they expect sellers (buyers) to subscribe with the same marketplace as well, in order to meet the appropriate matching partner. The extant literature, e.g. Jullien (2001, 2003) , claims that in such markets intermediaries have to subsidize agents on one side of the market together with recovering the associated loss with the other market side in order to attract agents for subscription. We show that subsidizing one side of the market is easier for a consortia-led intermediating B2B marketplace than for an independent third-party marketplace. This is due to the feature that biased marketplaces already comprise matching partners from one market side, whereas independent marketplaces merely offer intermediation and matching services. The availability of differentiated ownership structures of intermediating marketplaces as proposed in this paper deeply affects the market structure. I.e. the benchmark result of Jullien (2001, 2003) where an incumbent intermediary is able to exert market power does not generally hold in such a scenario. In particular, we show that even if the in-cumbent has a reputation advantage, the challenging collaborative entrant is able to catch at least some market share. When registration is exclusively possible with only one marketplace and intermediaries compete in access fees, the entrant is able to overcome its reputation disadvantage while monopolizing the market, whenever the number of firms that provide the collaborative B2B marketplace is sufficiently large. The possibility of applying transaction taxes as an additional pricing instrument benefits the challenging consortium. While being a perfect substitute to the application of access fees in terms of extracting profits from participants, a high transaction fee reduces the cost of attracting firms substantially.
If firms can simultaneously subscribe with both marketplaces, the buy-side consortium can always enter the market. However, in such a situation both intermediaries stay in the market with positive profits. Sellers then register with both intermediaries and buyers that do not participate in the provision of the challenging marketplace stay with the incumbent. Indeed, we can widely observe such market structures in the B2B landscape where collaborative marketplaces comprise their owners as only users from the respective market side. Because of coordination costs it is sometimes difficult to form a large pool of companies to provide a joint marketplace in practice. The benefit of the collaborative marketplace, comes in particular from a large number of owners. Accordingly, in industries where it is not easy to attract sufficient firms to jointly provide a platform, there will be greater opportunities for independent intermediaries.
Our model could be extended in various directions. In this paper we took the number of firms providing the collaborative B2B marketplace as exogenously given since we were interested in how many owners would be necessary to enable such a consortium to enter the market. An interesting extension would be to define the number of firms that engage in the provision of such a joined B2B marketplace endogenously. A further topic would be to study collaborative marketplaces that are provided by firms from both market sides. This will be taken up in future research.
Proof of Proposition 1
Note that (4) can be simplified, yielding
The left hand side of (14) is always the case given our initial assumption that for all j with j = i, it holds that u j < 2u i . In order to sustain a dominant firm equilibrium, I's pricing decision has to be such that I's profit is (weakly) positive: that enables I to be the only active intermediary in a dominant market equilibrium.
In case that n EO b = 1, meaning that all buy-side firms provide the collaborative buy-side B2B platform, (14) reads as
which must be fulfilled together with (15) would be negative in (17) , enabling E to enter with any
. This is due to our assumption that 2u s > u b > u s . 18 2. Now consider subsidizing the sellers' side by I's pricing strategy, so that p I s < 0.
From (15) and (4) we then get the following prices, I could apply to deter entry by E:
Since a price p I i > u i would hinder agents i from participation at I,
can maximally be equal to zero so the maximal value for n EO b that enables I to apply an entry deterring pricing strategy is 0.5. On the other hand, subsidizing sellers requires that p I s < 0, this is only possible, if n EO
From that it follows, that I can only apply an entry deterring pricing strategy, if Accordingly, in the first two cases the incumbent can apply and entry deterring pricing strategy yielding at least zero profits, in the third case this is not possible.
•
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to sustain an equilibrium with I as dominant firm, I's profit has to be (weakly)
positive, yielding 
We have to distinguish to cases with respect to p I b :
1. For the case p I b < 0, I's pricing strategy has to be such that We are aware of the multiplicity of potential equilibria. In particular we are therefore interested in the maximum possible profit the entrant could achieve, given that the incumbent wants to minimize this profit. To determine this lower bound, we consider the incumbents pricing strategy such that (20) 
